Written by: Sonja Colford
Edited by: Ada Collins
On December 12, 2016, about 15km outside the city of Paris, 196 Parties elected to adopt the revolutionary Paris Climate Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015). The Agreement is recognized as one of the world’s most successful examples of international cooperation and multilateralism (Dimitrov, 2016). 196 Parties with radically contrasting interests and motives came together and negotiated a resounding collaboration which left all members satisfied. But how was this achieved? What made COP21 such a success in light of previous failures? Are global environmental agreements simply Potemkin promises, plagued by diplomatic secrecy and obscurity, or are they actionable contracts with tangible viability?
‘A CLIMATE OF CHANGE’
The global discourse on climate change and environmental protection had been growing for decades. In 1972, the first ever United Nations Conference on the Human Environment took place in Stockholm, Sweden (UNFCCC, n.d.). With 113 governments, 250 NGOs, and two heads of state in attendance, including Gandhi, the conference set a precedent for addressing global environmental damage and climate change mitigation (Chasek, 2020). Its outcomes included the Stockholm Declaration, which was the world’s first set of agreed-upon principles to confront climate change, addressing revolutionary concepts in areas like sustainable development, generational obligation, and protections for developing nations which would later become central to international environmental law (Chasek, 2020).
Another result of the Stockholm Conference was the Stockholm Action Plan, an actionable list of proposals and priorities, yet it lacked enforceability and did not estimate and allocate the necessary financial resources for proper implementation (Chasek, 2020). This deficiency, however, provided data on the inefficiency of strong, but non-legally-binding norms and would later be rectified at future conferences with stricter language enshrined into formal declarations. The 1972 Stockholm Conference also directly resulted in the establishment of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) (UNRIC, 2022). The Stockholm Conference, being the first ever of its kind, was an overall breakthrough in the global ideologies surrounding climate change, and was the first step in achieving an international discourse on the topic.
Just twenty years later, in 1992, came the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Further exploring sustainable development, which was still novel at the time, as well as recognizing the need for integration of social, economic, and environmental factors, the Rio Summit was pivotal (UN, n.d.). It produced Agenda 21, a thorough international agreement signed by more than 178 countries, which outlined aspects such as ‘Social and Economic Dimensions’, ‘Conservation and Management of Resources for Development’, and ‘Means of Implementation’ (Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, n.d.; United Nations, 1992). The Earth Summit also led to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was signed by 158 Parties (Jackson, 2007). Future meetings of this Convention would go on to formulate the Berlin Mandate, a concrete directive instructing developed nations to commit to tangible measures reducing their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Oxford Reference, n.d.). In fulfilment of this this Mandate, the Kyoto Protocol arose in Japan in 1997, and was one of the most significant pieces of international climate change policy, as it required that industrialised countries’ GHG emissions fall to at least 5% below 1990 levels by a target period of 2008 to 2012 (Jackson, 2007). The 1992 Earth Summit, which opened a chain reaction ending with the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, formed the basis of modern environmentalist worldviews and multilateral climate governance.
THE PARIS AGREEMENT
Following these decades of meetings and negotiations, COP21 held in 2015 came as a shocking victory, described by countries at the Conference’s final session as “‘revolutionary’ (Venezuela), ‘a tremendous collective achievement’ (the EU), ‘a marvellous act’ (China), ‘a resounding triumph…’ (St. Lucia) introducing a ‘new era of global climate governance’ (Egypt), and ‘a tremendous victory for the planet’ (USA)...” (Dimitrov, 2016). As the first binding agreement between all nations to take action against climate change, it was a landmark in modern climate governance. But why did the Paris Agreement (PA) prevail so decisively over previous attempts? What gave it such an edge?
There were numerous desired end goals for the PA, as diverse as they were plentiful. The EU, the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) wished the PA to act as a strong, legally-binding contract, with quantifiable, enforceable, and renewable policy updates communicated on a recurring basis. China also wanted the PA to be legally-binding, but for different reasons; while most nations in favour of the legal nature of the Agreement were also in favour of strong international transparency, China did not want the accountability associated with such transparency (Dimitrov, 2016). In other words, they wanted a way out of the scrutinization of international norms.
Another nation that wanted an escape route from such scrutiny was the US. In a tense, public moment, just minutes before the end of the Conference’s final session, the US requested a word change: “Developed countries ‘should’ rather than ‘shall’ undertake economy-wide quantified emission reductions” (Dimitrov, 2016). The US was ready to pull out of the deal over this single word, with US Secretary of State John Kerry stating, “‘We cannot do this and we will not do this. And either it changes or President Obama and the United States will not be able to support this agreement’” (Keating, 2015). This change was never openly debated and was added to the Agreement as a “‘technical correction’ together with punctuation changes” (Dimitrov, 2016).
Another contentious issue for the various Parties was the PA’s long-term objective. AOSIS wanted the world to be emissions-free by 2060-2080, the EU wanted percentage-based emissions-reductions of 80-95% by 2050, while a group of Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) and the US wanted weaker, less quantitative measures. Still, the overall consensus remained such that public resistance to a 1.5°C ceiling benchmark would have been “politically inexpedient” (Dimitrov, 2016). Finance and other economic implications, predictably, presented another large hurdle in the negotiations over long-term objectives. The island States demanded a systematic reparative process for the loss and damage they incurred from years of climate change impacts including rising sea levels, extreme weather events, and coral reef disappearance, however states in the Global North largely fettered this prospect by refusing to accept provisions which would inculpate them financially (Dimitrov, 2016; Talakai, 2013). Generally, rich, Northern countries did not want to make financial promises, nor recognize the differences between “developed” and “developing” nations and their respective financial obligations in light of climate responsibilities and impact distributions. In an internal document, The Umbrella Group (consisting of non-EU developed nations like Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, among others), the EU, and Switzerland refused “unacceptable bifurcated proposals [by the G77] for quantified commitments for public finance by developed countries only” and instead argued for a more intricate and multi-dimensional approach to determining national fiscal responsibility (Dimitrov, 2016).
In the end, as Dimitrov analyses, COP21 was primarily so successful because every Member State gave and took effectively. China lost its legal bondage and lack of transparency, but gained more nuanced differentiation between developed and developing countries. The US got its legally weak Agreement, but took the loss on the mandatory and reportable progression of nationally-determined contributions (NDCs). The EU secured transparency, finance, and loss and damage, but failed on achieving specific emissions-reduction targets. Finally, while island states did not achieve their loss and damage goals, they did succeed in obtaining the 1.5°C reference prominently featured in the Agreement (Dimitrov, 2016).
The finale of the Conference negotiations boasted an expertly balanced conclusion which satisfied every participating Member State to such an extent that the Agreement was adopted. The commendation for this accomplishment went to many, primarily the French government, who hosted the Conference. Radoslav S. Dimitrov’s analysis in his piece “The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Behind Closed Doors” credits two distinct variables for the Conference’s success: “persuasion and organisational tactics”. According to research conducted through exclusive inside presence, Dimitrov found that the Conference, which lasted about two weeks, was shrouded in secrecy and obfuscation (Dimitrov, 2016).
“Civil society delegates were left out of negotiating sessions and could only watch TV screens with live coverage of some sessions. Most government delegates also lost access in the second week, when additional required passes were introduced and only four per delegation were provided for the key meetings. Major countries such as Germany had to borrow passes from small countries to keep its diplomats fully involved” (Dimitrov, 2016).
On top of this, meetings were commonly held in private until the last minute, often leaving nations with a take-it-or-leave-it deal, prompting hasty and perhaps imprudent decision-making. In the name of reducing the complications that inevitably would arise from having hundreds of Parties with different requests in the same room, organisers held smaller gatherings, made many executive decisions on their own, and as soon as a consensus was reached, the given subject could no longer be renegotiated. The French ran secret meetings, often held between only two or three Parties, and whose contents as well as results were unknown to uninvited Members. Dimitrov himself attended such a meeting: in it, the US and Saudi Arabia discussed a secret bilateral deal of which no records were kept. He writes:
“The meeting took place in a small room of 5 by 5 metres, among only 10 individuals. My delegation was asked to accept or reject the [deal], without rights to negotiate or modify…there was no paper copy of the legal text in question that was only displayed on a small screen, and we were explicitly told not to take photos” (Dimitrov, 2016).
This level of obscurity for such large-scale global diplomacy is striking. Whether or not the participating States were aware of the level of concealment during the two-week negotiations, it is a testament to the organisational prowess of the French leadership in devising such a coordinated system that an agreement was reached in the first place. Prioritising obscurity and efficiency over transparency and good faith, the Conference was, despite its skillful orchestration, an undermining of the integrity of global environmental agreements at large. COP21 was a resounding success not only in large-scale diplomatic relations, then, but also in large-scale secrecy and obscurity.
A POTEMKIN PROMISE?
The Paris Climate Agreement has undoubtedly had some positive impacts. It has directed the efforts of nations worldwide towards collective climate action, driving ambitious targets, and facilitating the widespread adoption of policies that will curb global warming and promote sustainable development. It represents a multilateral deal - the first of its kind to be so widely agreed upon - detailing a blueprint for global cooperation that everyone could make peace with. But, as Alice Hill of the Council on Foreign Relations puts it, “The Paris Agreement is not enough. Even at the time of negotiation, it was recognized as not being enough” (Maizland, 2023). The credit the Paris Agreement receives is not unfounded, there is just more to be done.
The PA is dangerous precisely because it appears to be a done deal. People—leaders, corporations, citizens—invoke the Paris Agreement as the be-all-end-all self-justifier, the proof that the climate issue has been solved, or is at least sufficiently on its way to being solved. However, the climate crisis is far from having been solved. In fact, with leadership shifts, Parties reneging on their commitments, and climate change being overshadowed by other global issues all too often, the climate is not getting near the amount of attention that it needs. Even if commitments are met, experts find that it will not be enough. The world’s average temperature will rise by 2°C by 2100 even if all Parties execute their pledges (Maizland, 2023).
The PA appears impressive. It seems expansive and all-encompassing. Largely, it is—it is a collectively agreed-upon document detailing a multi-dimensional approach to climate change— but it is all up to the nations who choose, or choose not, to implement it effectively. Hill states, “It was only a first step, and the expectation was that as time went on, countries would return with greater ambition to cut their emissions” (Maizland, 2023). Built of Potemkin splendour and attraction, the Paris Agreement has the potential to become such an empty promise. Giving the illusion of progress, a symbol over substance, the Paris Agreement may be a rickety old façade, lacking the structural integrity for lasting change. Destined for permanent incompletion, the Potemkin Village does not promise systemic change; such is the absence of binding contractual obligation in the PA which grants Parties the freedom to remain static, to enter this state of incompletion themselves.
While the Paris Climate Agreement represents a significant step forward in global climate governance, its potential to become a Potemkin promise must not be underestimated. The Agreement offers a façade of unity and ambition that has been forged by secrecy and deception. It relies on voluntary commitments, lacks enforceable mechanisms, and risks becoming nothing more than an illusion of change. Rather than a catalyst for meaningful impact, the Paris Agreement may not be all that it promises to be, instead acting as an empty symbol capable of nothing but upholding appearances. On the contrary, it may present such a beautiful exterior that it inspires the people of the Potemkin Village to rebuild in the image of the beauty their surface holds.
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